INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS PDF
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EC Industrial dovolena-na-lodi.info - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online. on methods of traditional Industrial Economics (bricks-and-mortar economy). dovolena-na-lodi.info Course Description. This is the first part of Industrial Economics sequence, a branch of economics that studies market structures and a nature of market power, .
Macroeconomics examines economy-wide phenomena such as changes in unemployment, national income, rate of growth, gross domestic product, inflation and price levels.
The factors that are studied by macro and micro will often influence each other, such as the current level of unemployment in the economy as a whole will affect the supply of workers which an oil company can hire from, for example. Durbin says "Economics is the intellectual religion of the days. It guides him that how he should combine the four factors of production and minimize the cost of production. He will spend his income according the law of Equi-Marginal utility in order to get maximum satisfaction.
Industrial Economics 3 3. Under developed countries are facing many problems like unemployment , over population low per capita income and low production. Economics is very useful in solving these problems. Economics guides him that how he should frame the tax policy and monetary policy.
For this purpose Marginal productivity theory is suggested by economics. The thing which happen daily around us have an important economic bearing. So there is also the cultural value of the study of economics. It enables him to understand and criticize the economic policies of the government. He can also guide the government. Through planning we can utilize our natural resources in better way and can improve our economic condition.
It enables them to get the right of trade union , collective bargaining and fixation of working hours. The advanced countries desire is that there should be economic stability and full employment without inflation to achieve these objectives, economics is very useful for them.
The study of economic development will enable them to make the optimum use of their resources. It helps the importers and exporters to earn maximum profit. A businessman can easily understand the trade policies of various countries. It includes the combination of the various institutions, agencies, entities or even sectors as described by some authors and consumers that comprise the economic structure of a given community.
A related concept is the mode of production. The study of economic systems includes how these various agencies and institutions are linked to one another, how information flows between them, and the social relations within the system including property rights and the structure of management.
Industrial Economics 5 Among existing economic systems, distinctive methods of analysis have developed, such as socialist economics and Islamic economic jurisprudence. Today the dominant form of economic organization at the global level is based on marketoriented mixed economies. Economic systems is the category in the Journal of Economic Literature classification codes that includes the study of such systems.
One field that cuts across them is comparative economic systems. Indifference Curve : An indifference curve is a graph showing combination of two goods that give the consumer equal satisfaction and utility.
Definition: An indifference curve is a graph showing combination of two goods that give the consumer equal satisfaction and utility.
Each point on an indifference curve indicates that a consumer is indifferent between the two and all points give him the same utility. Description: Graphically, the indifference curve is drawn as a downward sloping convex to the origin. The graph shows a combination of two goods that the consumer consumes.
Industrial Economics 6 Significance of Indifference Curve Analysis: In indifference curve approach only ordination of preferences is needed. It overcomes the weakness of Cardinal measurement as the satisfaction cannot be measured objectively. The cardinal approach provides the assumption of constant utility of money, which is unrealistic. In indifference curve approach, this assumption has been dropped. Indifference curve approach is base for the measurement of 'consumer's surplus'.
In a way it contributes to the Welfare economics. Indifference curve is a better tool to classify substitutes and complementary goods. Industrial Economics 7 Properties of Indifference Curves The main attributes or properties or characteristics of indifference curves are as follows: 1 Indifference Curves are Negatively Sloped: The indifference curves must slope downward from left to right.
As the consumer increases the consumption of X commodity, he has to give up certain units of Y commodity in order to maintain the same level of satisfaction. DIAGRAM: In the above diagram, two combinations of commodity cooking oil and commodity wheat is shown by the points a and b on the same indifference curve. The consumer is indifferent towards points a and b as they represent equal level of satisfaction.
The combination of goods which lies on a higher indifference curve will be preferred by a consumer to the combination which lies on a lower indifference curve. They are convex to the origin. As the consumer substitutes commodity X for commodity Y, the marginal rate of substitution diminishes as X for Y along an indifference curve. The Slope of the curve is referred as the Marginal Rate of Substitution. The Marginal Rate of Substitution is the rate at which the consumer must sacrifice units of one commodity to obtain one more unit of another commodity.
Diagram: In the above diagram, as the consumer moves from A to B to C to D, the willingness to substitute good X for good Y diminishes. The slope of IC is negative. Thus indifference curve is steeper towards the Y axis and gradual towards the X axis. It is convex to the origin. If the indifference curve is concave, MRSxy increases. It violets the fundamental feature of consumer behaviour. If commodities are almost perfect substitutes then MRSxy remains constant.
In such cases the indifference curve is a straight line at an angle of 45 degree with either axis. If two commodities are perfect complements, the indifference curve will have a right angle. In reality, commodities are not perfect substitutes or perfect complements to each other. Therefore MRSxy usually diminishes. It is because at the point of tangency, the higher curve will give as much as of the two commodities as is given by the lower indifference curve.
This is absurd and impossible. Diagram: In the above diagram, two indifference curves are showing cutting each other at point B. The combinations represented by points B and F given equal satisfaction to the consumer because both lie on the same indifference curve IC2.
Similarly the combinations shows by points B and E on indifference curve IC1 give equal satisfaction top the consumer. If combination F is equal to combination B in terms of satisfaction and combination E is equal to combination B in satisfaction. It follows that the combination F will be equivalent to E in terms of satisfaction. This conclusion looks quite funny because combination F on IC2 contains more of good Y wheat Industrial Economics 10 than combination which gives more satisfaction to the consumer.
We, therefore, conclude that indifference curves cannot cut each other. He is not supposed to purchase only one commodity. In that case indifference curve will touch one axis. This violates the basic assumption of indifference curves. Such indifference curves are against our basic assumption.
Our basic assumption is that the consumer buys two goods in combination. Consumer Equilibrium :The state of balance achieved by an end user of products that refers to the amount of goods and services they can purchase given their present level of income and the current level of prices.
Consumer equilibrium allows a consumer to obtain the most satisfaction possible from their income.
All consumers strive to maximize their utility. We try to get as much satisfaction as we can. Getting to the indifference curve which is farthest Industrial Economics 11 from the origin gives the highest total utility. Although the goal of the consumer is maximization of satisfaction, the means of achieving the goal is not clear. Higher indifference curve not only gives higher satisfaction but also are more expensive. Here we are confronted with the basic conflict between preferences and the prices of the commodities consumer wants to consume.
With a given amount of money income to spent, we cannot attain the highest satisfaction but have to settle for less.
Production is a process of combining various material inputs and immaterial inputs plans, know-how in order to make something for consumption the output. It is the act of creating output, a good or service which has value and contributes to the utility of individuals. Economic well-being is created in a production process, meaning all economic activities that aim directly or indirectly to satisfy human needs.
The degree to which the needs are satisfied is often accepted as a measure of economic well-being. In production there are two features which explain increasing economic well-being. They are improving quality-price-ratio of goods and services and increasing incomes from growing and more efficient market production. All of them produce commodities which have value and contribute to well-being of individuals.
The satisfaction of needs originates from the use of the goods and services which are produced. The need satisfaction increases when the quality-price-ratio of the goods and services improves and more satisfaction is achieved at less cost. As a result.
Suppose that both parties know c but only the buyer knows v. More generally. A model Let us formalise some of the above ideas using a simple model of a vertical relationship between a buyer and a seller.
That is so because. We first want to focus on the issue of ex post efficiency. EC Industrial economics parties could write a contract ex ante specifying the terms of trade ex post. Let v denote the value of the good to the buyer this can be the difference between the value to the buyer in this relationship and that in an alternative relationship.
If there is no trade. Gains from trade exist with some probability between 0 and 1. There are several reasons for this. The answer is that they might. This is where the bounded rationality idea comes in: To simplify the problem. If v and c are known to both parties at the beginning of period 2. We can now state an important theoretical prediction of the transaction costs approach: The two parties can. Some bargaining will have to take place ex post.
Hence the more specific the investment. The supplier will choose p to maximise this. If there is trade. If the two parties have equal bargaining power. He chooses I to maximise his net profit. For efficiency. We want to focus on how ex post bargaining affects the volume of investment undertaken.
Recall that to avoid some purely technical problems we have assumed that when a party is indifferent between trading and not trading. In other words. In any case. So far there was no ex ante relation-specific investment in the model.
Note that the cost of investment I is not relevant as far as the division of the ex post surplus is concerned because this investment has already been sunk when the two parties bargain. In period 1 the supplier chooses how much to invest. Size and structure of firms there are gains from trade. The fact that the buyer would appropriate all the surplus is irrelevant as far as efficiency is concerned. Activity Show that. In those cases. Now let us assume that one of the parties.
In period 2 the trading price p will be determined through bargaining. Answer The contract should simply give the power to choose the price p in period 2 to the buyer i. When making this decision he anticipates what will happen in period 2. The model can also be refined to analyse the effect of the degree of investment specificity on the level of ex ante investment. You can also think of it as the value of I that would be chosen if the supplier and the buyer merged into a single entity.
A division of this through a lump sum could be agreed. It turns out that the level of investment is correspondingly lower the higher the degree of specificity. But what if both parties in a relationship can make an investment to increase the gains from trade? Vertical integration restores the efficient level of investment.
Thus the higher the degree of specificity. Answer The parties could sign a contract ex ante that specifies the process through which the amount of trade and a lump sum transfer are determined ex post. The supplier invests less than what is required for efficiency. Actually in our example a contractual solution is feasible.
Since the ex post surplus is divided between the two parties. The contract should give to the investing party i. Is this level of investment efficient? The efficient level of investment is the value of I that maximises the joint net profit v — c I — I. Activity Could a contract between the parties restore the efficient outcome? When should this contract be signed and what should it specify?
Assume that a contract which directly specifies the level of investment that the supplier is to undertake is not feasible because investment levels.
In period 1 the seller would choose I to maximise v — c I — I. You may think of this as an investment in flexibility. Hart and Moore Note that the possession of residual rights of control does not rule out ex post renegotiation bargaining.
We assume for simplicity that v and c are already known to both parties in period 1. Property rights Hart and others have pointed out that. Chapters 2—4. Trade will occur in any case. In period 1 a buyer and a supplier contract to trade in period 2. In this model there are two periods. The value of the improvement to the buyer is initially uncertain and can take two values: The level of investment is not verifiable by outsiders.
This uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of period 2 i. And if vertical integration improves efficiency. According to this view. Exactly why does integration solve or reduce the hold-up problem i.
Size and structure of firms The above analysis has left some questions unanswered. We now consider three different institutional arrangements. In this way it affects the division of the surplus ex post and therefore also influences the level of investment ex ante. Does it matter who acquires whom when two firms merge — in other words.
In this model both parties can take actions that increase the expected gains from trade: Tirole If it turns out that the value of the improvement is v. The improvement will not be made. Non-integration This leads to unconstrained bargaining in period 2 i.
In period 1. Integration under buyer control The buyer decides in period 2 whether to impose the improvement — or the buyer can bargain and offer to give away this authority in return for a transfer. Because not making the improvement is the less costly action for the supplier in case of disagreement. The buyer will choose x to maximise this. Gains from the improvement will be split equally between them. That is. The previous results apply: If it turns out that the value of the improvement is 0.
EC Industrial economics 1. The supplier will have to pay c but will not get any part of v. The party with the residual rights of control can unilaterally decide whether the improvement is made or not in a case of no agreement. Integration under supplier control The supplier decides in period 2 whether the improvement is made — or the supplier can bargain and offer to give this authority away in return for a transfer.
The parties will agree that the improvement be made if its value is revealed to be v. In this case the buyer can choose to impose the improvement if some other arrangement is not reached: Gains from the improvement. This is equivalent to unconstrained bargaining. If firm A acquires firm B. The intuition is that because the buyer can impose the improvement on the supplier and therefore does not have to worry about its cost.
Things are more complicated when there is separation of ownership from control and delegation of authority within firms. On the other hand. Size and structure of firms The buyer will choose x to maximise this.
General conclusions of the property rights approach Several conclusions have emerged from the property rights approach. So if assets are independent. The best arrangement is the one with the highest joint expected net surplus — because any division of the joint expected net surplus between the parties can be specified through a lump sum transfer. You should also bear in mind some qualifications to this. To conclude: Consider the case of two owner-managed firms that enter into a long-run relationship and must both make a relation-specific investment.
The joint expected net surplus from the improvement is: Crawford and Alchian is the petroleum industry. Lafontaine and Slade provide a survey of the empirical literature on the boundaries of the firm. Monteverde and Teece tested this hypothesis econometrically using data on different components used by two big US car manufacturers. Fisher refused to locate their plants close to GM plants — a move which GM thought would increase production efficiency but which would diminish the bargaining power of Fisher.
To minimise the scope for opportunistic behaviour. One of their main hypotheses was that car manufacturers will vertically integrate produce in-house when the production process for components generates transaction-specific knowhow.
This explains why it is a common arrangement for pipelines to be jointly owned by producers oil wells and refiners. That is so because it is then more difficult for car manufacturers to switch to other suppliers. The dependent variable in their regressions was a binary variable for in-house production versus production by an external supplier. Monteverde and Teece have examined why firms in the automobile industry produce some components in-house while they buy others from independent suppliers.
As we will see in later chapters of this guide.
Oil wells are often connected to refineries by pipelines. In the case of tankers. Their independent variables included the cost of developing a component a 18 Other studies have focused on the related issue of the role of investment specificity for the type and duration of contracts signed between firms. This helps to explain why tankers are generally under independent ownership.
In GM. The owner of the pipeline has significant market power. Activity 3 below. Empirical evidence Much of the empirical work on the determinants of firm size and structure that has followed the transaction costs approach has focused on the role of investment specificity for vertical integration.
Joskow is a good example. These tensions ended in EC Industrial economics Lowering transaction costs and mitigating opportunistic behaviour are not the only reasons for vertical integration i. Firms therefore exist in order to solve or mitigate this problem. Their results confirmed the predictions of the transaction costs approach: A good collection of articles — representing the different views and including contributions by some of the protagonists of the debate — has been published in the April issue of the Journal of Law and Economics.
This creates an incentive for each team member to shirk and free ride on the efforts of others. Note that full references for all readings cited in the Activities can be found in Appendix 2. You can also search the internet for more information. Activities 1.
Online Text and Notes in Industrial Economics
Contracting among themselves is difficult for team members. This debate is not just about a particular event in economic history. They argued that factors of production are often more productive when they are members of a team rather than when used on their own. Could the two trends be related. If the critics are right. Why is this the case?
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Why not a series of contracts between the student and each of his or her instructors? Would it matter if contracts were complete? Crawford and Alchian interpretation of the merger between General Motors and Fisher Body has been criticised by some economists. It is about one of the most frequently cited examples of market failure.
The Klein. Size and structure of firms proxy for the know-how generated in the production of a component. Alchian and Demsetz 11 suggested that team production provides a rationale for the existence and structure of firms. What do you think? Make up your own mind after reading different views on the GM—Fisher Body case. Since the s there has been a trend towards de-integration across many industries as well as a trend towards more flexible technologies.
Why or why not? Both c and v are commonly known at the beginning of period 2. EC Industrial economics A reminder of your learning outcomes Having completed this chapter. Let v denote the value of the good to the buyer. There are two periods and the two parties can. What is the efficient level of investment?
Then explain how investment specificity and the incompleteness of contracts may affect the decision of a firm to vertically integrate and discuss briefly any relevant empirical evidence.
Explain why this level is not efficient. Now suppose that the parties sign a contract which gives to the buyer the right to choose the trading price in period 2. Consider the following model of a vertical relationship between a buyer and a seller.
Analyse how investment specificity affects the ex ante incentives for investment when there is ex post bargaining over the surplus. Sample examination questions 1. What will be the level of I chosen by the seller? Suppose that the parties sign a contract which gives to the seller the right to choose the trading price in period 2 i.
In the absence of any contract. The seller can invest in period 1 to increase the value of the good to the buyer for instance. What is your conclusion about who should have the power to decide the price in period 2? Explain the intuition for your results. The level of investment I cannot be specified in a contract because it is not verifiable and therefore such a contract would not be enforceable in court.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 1 Chapter 2: Separation of ownership and control Chapter 2: Separation of ownership and control Introduction A common assumption in most economic theory is that firms maximise expected profits. Journals Abowd. This is probably what the owners of a firm would like to do. Learning outcomes By the end of this chapter and having completed the Essential reading and activities.
Further reading Book Holmstrom. Van Reenen. Essential reading Church. This separation of ownership and control gives rise to several important issues. Review of Economics and Statistics 90 The manager chooses between two levels of effort.
If the manager makes no effort. Journal of Political Economy 4 The manager would then accept the job and make high effort. At this stage. Nicolitsas and N.
If the owners wanted high effort. Given the incentive scheme chosen by the owners. We assume that he can always obtain a reservation wage w0. Some important insights on the use of incentives can be drawn from a simple model of a firm run by a single manager.
Faced with this contract. After the manager has made his choice. Note that the strict concavity of u implies that the manager is risk averse. If the owners wanted no effort. Now consider the following set-up. Essentially this involves linking the compensation of managers to firm performance.
This implies ensuring that the manager obtains utility exactly U0: EC Industrial economics Nickell.
European Economic Review 41 Note that this objective function implies that the owners are risk neutral. Managerial incentives An obvious way for the owners to restrict managerial discretion or to induce managers to put more effort into the job is to offer monetary or other incentives to managers.
More specifically. But this does not ensure that the The need for an incentive scheme arises when the effort level of the manager cannot be observed by the owners and hence cannot be prescribed in the contract. Since the manager gets the same wage whatever the realisation of profit turns out to be. Separation of ownership and control Let us assume that this holds.
In this maximisation problem both constraints are satisfied with equality. We have assumed. Conclude that. All the risk is borne by the owners the risk neutral party.
.1 Introduction the Scope of Industrial Economics and Its History
The first constraint says that. This is a result of the concavity of u. The second constraint says that the expected utility of the manager if he makes high effort the left-hand side of the inequality is at least as large as his expected utility if he makes zero effort the righthand side of the inequality. If they want to induce the manager to exert high effort. The incentive scheme chosen by the owners. Activity Prove that. Note that if the owners want to induce no effort.
Answer Solve the following trivial maximisation problem for the owners: Net profit will be the same as under observability of effort. What will the owners choose to do: It depends on whether their maximised net profit is higher under high effort or under zero effort.
One reason for the gradual decline of the U-form and the emergence of the M-form may have been the need to limit managerial discretion. The effects of product market competition on managerial incentives can take several forms and may sometimes be ambiguous. This may reduce slack. Limits to managerial discretion There are several other mechanisms. Three such factors have been identified: If managers fail to maximise profits.
Nickell et al. The effectiveness of this mechanism may be reduced by the difficulty of measuring individual effort when team work is important.
The effectiveness of this mechanism is reduced by the fact that the collection of information on the firm by outsiders may be costly. Managers wishing to avoid this will work hard to maximise profits.
Takeovers may also have perverse incentive effects. Some of the most important are as follows: The internal organisation of a firm can help mitigate managerial slack. Empirical evidence Empirical work on the performance of firms for instance.
Managers care for their careers and are eager to acquire good reputations. EC Industrial economics same is true when effort is unobservable. What is the empirical evidence on the effects of monetary incentives and performance-related pay? Do they generally increase productivity as the theory predicts? Can they possibly backfire. And there is much more on the internet. In addition. Bloom and Van Reenen argue that productivity differences across firms and countries largely reflect variations in management practices and that product market competition has an important influence in increasing aggregate management quality by helping to eliminate badly managed firms.
If we accept. Make up your own mind after reading some of the extensive empirical literature. PerezGonzalez and Wolfenzon Using industry-level data. Symeonidis has found clear evidence of a negative effect of cartels on productivity. The profit maximisation hypothesis Although there are many ways in which managerial discretion can be restricted.
Good references are: Bertrand and Schoar Meier and Rey-Biel References include Lazear To what extent is this a realistic view of firm behaviour? What are plausible alternatives to profit maximisation? Separation of ownership and control sector. Other studies have established a positive effect of trade liberalisation on the productivity of firms in various countries.
You can also search the internet for more. Is it a good idea to have a junior clerk in a bank on an incentive contract? Is it a good idea to have the chief executive officer of a bank on an incentive contract? Try to answer these questions after reading some of the literature on family firms.
Why are family firms so prevalent? Why are some successful and others struggling? What are the implications of family control for the governance and overall performance of firms?
Are family firms an efficient response to certain institutional and market environments. Profit maximisation is usually taken to be the goal of the firm in standard industrial economics models.
There is one category of firms where ownership and control are not separated. The firm is run by a manager who chooses between two levels of effort. After the manager has made her choice. The profit of a firm can take one of two values. The equilibrium market outcomes are therefore the equilibria of these games.
Chapter 3: Short-run price competition Chapter 3: We will start with the simplest competitive situations. Chapter 2. Since these long-run decisions are relatively difficult to change. As we will see. Ultimately there is also the decision of whether or not to enter or stay in a market. Repeated interaction is the subject of the next chapter. The main reason why it makes sense to abstract from these additional considerations in this chapter is that price and quantity are instruments that firms can change relatively easily in the short run.
How realistic are static models of oligopoly. In this chapter we focus on static models of oligopoly: We will examine several models. To identify them. These include product design. We can therefore proceed to analyse short-run competition among firms in the context of fixed cost structures and product characteristics. Throughout the second part of the guide. Some implications for competition policy will also be discussed. Note that there is a qualification to this result for the case of asymmetric marginal Activity Prove this result.
Chapter 5. The intuition is that unless prices are the same and equal to the common marginal cost. The basic Bertrand model Consider a very simple set up as follows. Chapter 8. The firm with the lowest price gets all the market demand at that price. The two firms interact only once and they simultaneously and independently set prices p1 and p2 respectively.
In particular: Further reading Books Cabral. There are two firms. Note that rigid capacity constraints are a special case of decreasing returns to scale i. One interpretation of the efficient rationing rule is that. In general. The firms have capacity constraints q1 and q2. We now look at a simple model to fix these ideas. There are three main resolutions to this paradox: The rationing of consumers results from the fact that the low-price firm cannot serve the entire market.
The exact equilibrium outcome in the above model depends on how small the capacities are and on what specific assumption we make about the way consumers are rationed. This part follows Tirole Such models also have equilibria with price greater than marginal cost. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Provided this is not higher than the monopoly price corresponding to its own cost. Hence firm i will make positive profit rather than zero. If firm i raises its price slightly above c. Then under the efficient rationing rule.
Short-run price competition costs: The question then arises as to which consumers end up buying from the high-price firm. At this price both firms sell up to their respective capacities and the market clears. This result and the concavity of the profit function ensure that any reduction of q below qi will reduce profit.
The answer is no. Then it has residual demand 1 — p — qj. The answer is again no. Activity Consider the model of price competition with capacity-constrained firms analysed above. Using the inverse demand function. This profit function is concave in q. Firm i cannot produce more than qi anyway. What do you think will happen if this condition is not satisfied? Note that this price is higher than marginal cost which is zero.
To show that this is a Nash equilibrium. In fact there is a much stronger result. There are two main conclusions from the above analysis. Choice of capacities One issue which was swept under the carpet in the above discussion is the choice of capacities. To examine this question. This is exactly what the formal analysis of such games predicts. The equilibrium of this game is the Cournot equilibrium see the analysis of the Cournot model below.
There exists. The former condition ensures that the latter one is also satisfied. We assumed that the firms were capacity-constrained. If this condition is not satisfied. One difficulty in oligopoly theory has been that the widely used Cournot model. Short-run price competition Answer Much of the analysis is the same as above. It is therefore valid to interpret the distinction between price competition Bertrand and quantity competition Cournot as a difference in the flexibility of production: Both these results rest on particular assumptions concerning the rationing rule.Note that the strict concavity of u implies that the manager is risk averse.
What do you think will happen if this condition is not satisfied? Chapter 1 looks at the theory and evidence on the factors determining the size and structure of firms.
The study of economic systems includes how these various agencies and institutions are linked to one another, how information flows between them, and the social relations within the system including property rights and the structure of management. The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied provided the profit function is concave. All of them produce commodities which have value and contribute to well-being of individuals.
This is equivalent to unconstrained bargaining. Activity Prove this result.
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